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THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE: THE CASE FOR PUTTING 
IT TO WORK, NOT TO REST 
Bradford Higdon 
I. INTRODUCTION  
In its simplest form, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine works to prevent 
lower federal courts from hearing direct appeals of state court decisions, 
a right statutorily reserved for the Supreme Court of the United States 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257.1 In its most complicated form, however, 
the doctrine aims at limiting what would normally be considered proper 
federal jurisdiction and creates mayhem among the federal circuits’ 
jurisdictional analyses. Throughout the years, scholars2 and judges3 alike 
have criticized the doctrine for its ambiguity. Litigating parties have 
continually misapplied it in practice.4 Despite the chaos and criticism, 
however, the doctrine has withstood the test of time.  
One of the more recent assaults on the doctrine, by Chief Judge Sutton 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, calls for 
something more extreme than past criticisms: an overhaul. In 
VanderKodde v. Mary Jane M. Elliott, P.C.,5 a recent Sixth Circuit 
decision, Judge Sutton argued in his concurrence that the doctrine should 
 
 1.  28 U.S.C. § 1257. 
 2.  See, e.g., Jodi F. Manko, Collateral Estoppel and the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: The 
Problematic Effect These Preclusion and Jurisdictional Principles Have on Bankruptcy Law, 21 EMORY 
BANKR. DEV. J. 579 (2005); Adam McLain, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Toward a Workable Role, 
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1555 (2001); George L. Proctor et al., Rooker-Feldman and the Jurisdictional 
Quandary, 2 FLA. COASTAL L. J. 113 (2000); The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Rooker-Feldman: Worth 
Only The Powder To Blow It Up?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1081 (1999); Benjamin Smith, Comment: 
Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.: Beyond a Crude Analysis of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine’s Preclusion of 
Federal Jurisdiction, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 627 (1987); Susan Bandes, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: 
Evaluating Its Jurisdictional Status, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1175 (1999). 
 3.  See Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 467 (2006) (Stevens J., dissenting) (“Feldman […] was 
incorrectly decided and generated a plethora of confusion and debate among scholars and judges”); Arnold 
v. KJD Real Estate, LLC, 752 F.3d 700, 706 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Courts often confuse Rooker-Feldman 
cases with cases involving ordinary claim or issue preclusion”); Gray v. Nussbeck (In re Gray), 573 B.R. 
868, 872 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2017) (“A difficulty is that ‘general confusion’ surrounds Rooker-Feldman, and 
as difficult as it is to decipher, it is even more difficult to apply”); Mangan v. Brierre, No. 06-3204, 2007 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9390, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2007) (“The continued viability of Rooker-Feldman is 
under fire”). 
 4.  See, e.g., Senatore v. OCWEN Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 16 CV 8125 (VB), 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 140965, at *8 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2017) (“[Plaintiff] repeatedly confuses and/or conflates the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine and res judicata”); Parson v. Miles, Civil Action No. 4:17-cv-00708-RBH-
KDW, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178198, at *3 n.3 (D.S.C. Oct. 17, 2018) (“Plaintiff appears to confuse the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine with the principles of res judicata”). 
 5.  951 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 2020) (Sutton, J., concurring). 
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be abandoned.6 While not a new idea, his proposition reinforces the 
criticisms voiced by lower courts that the doctrine is not only confusing 
but entirely unworkable. As Judge Sutton wrote, “Rooker-Feldman is 
back to its old tricks of interfering with efforts to vindicate federal rights 
and misleading federal courts into thinking they have no jurisdiction over 
cases Congress empowered them to decide.”7 In short, the lower courts’ 
tango with the doctrine often involves too many missteps.  
Resting heavily on judicial principles such as federalism and comity, 
the doctrine intends to establish boundaries.8 In reality, it blurs them.9 
And while the statutes establishing the doctrine are straightforward, the 
doctrine itself is not, serving as proof that often well-intentioned judicial 
elaboration can quickly turn into expansion of the law. In practice, the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine does little more than unnecessarily constrain 
the jurisdiction of federal district courts and create confusing standards 
for litigants. However, while Judge Sutton argues that it is time to put the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine to rest once and for all, the U.S. Supreme Court 
is unlikely to embrace that approach anytime soon. This approach is also 
not the best way to maximize judicial efficiency. The doctrine has its 
place in modern jurisdictional discourse and case law, but it needs 
clarification and elaboration to be useful. As it stands, the doctrine 
remains vague enough for lower courts to continually misconstrue its 
boundaries, thereby creating inconsistent and conflicting case law. The 
doctrine ought to be revisited, not abandoned. 
Lower courts’ missteps when applying the doctrine are largely 
attributable to a lack of Supreme Court guidance. With this in mind, this 
Note reviews the Rooker-Feldman doctrine’s framework and application. 
Section II briefly traces the doctrine’s history and developments, 
including recent circuit splits surrounding the doctrine. Section III 
explains Judge Sutton’s recent criticism of the doctrine in his 
 
 6.  Id. at 409 (Sutton, J., concurring). 
 7.  Id. at 405 (Sutton, J., concurring). 
 8.  See, e.g., Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2003); Gilbert v. Ferry, 401 F.3d 
411, 418 (6th Cir. 2005),; Trivedi v. BD 112A LLC, No. 18-CV-313, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25079, at 
*12 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 13, 2020). 
 9.  Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 at 465 (2006) (“Although the District Court recognized the 
general rule that Rooker-Feldman may not be invoked against a federal-court plaintiff who was not 
actually a party to the prior state-court judgment , it nevertheless followed Tenth Circuit precedent in 
allowing application of Rooker-Feldman against parties who were in privity with a party to the earlier 
state-court action”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Gonzales v. Kohn Law Firm, No. 13-CV-
168, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134796, at *22 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 2, 2015) (“Asking whether something is 
inextricably intertwined can result in an overly-broad application of Rooker-Feldman that ignores the 
doctrine's underlying principles of comity, federalism, and finality”) (internal quotations omitted); Stuart 
v. Decision One Mortg. Co., LLC (In re Stuart), 367 B.R. 541, 554 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007) (“[A] possible 
by-product of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is the splitting of a plaintiff's cause of action between different 
courts due to the different remedies made available by a particular cause of action”).  
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VanderKodde concurrence. Section IV discusses why Judge Sutton’s 
complaints are warranted, but his solutions likely unrealistic, highlighting 
the unique purposes the doctrine serves. This Section also includes 
suggestions on where further clarity from the Supreme Court would be 
particularly helpful. Finally, Section V explains the ultimate importance 
of clarifying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and reiterates the doctrine’s 
need for further review.  
II. BACKGROUND 
To understand the circuit split between the courts on the application of 
Rooker-Feldman, it is first important to understand the doctrine’s origin. 
This Section begins by explaining the doctrine’s statutory basis, followed 
by a discussion of the two Supreme Court cases that created the doctrine 
as well as two later cases where the Court attempted to clarify and 
recalibrate the doctrine. 
A. The Doctrine’s Statutory Basis 
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is not a court-created principle, but 
rather a roadmap of general statutory principles. The doctrine is based 
mostly on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1257 and 1331, which both deal with federal court 
jurisdiction. § 1257, mandates that: “Final judgments […] rendered by the 
highest court of a State […], may be reviewed by the Supreme Court[.]”10 
The statute further stipulates that, for the purposes of this section, the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals is included as a “highest court of 
a State.”11  
Next, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 establishes that district courts “shall have 
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, 
laws, or treaties of the United States.” Combining these two statutes 
together creates what should be a simple premise: the only federal court 
that can hear appeals to judgments from the highest court in a state is the 
Supreme Court. In practice, however, as Rooker-Feldman’s case history 
suggests, this premise is far from simple.12 
 
 10.  28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). 
 11.  28 U.S.C. § 1257(b). 
 12.  Kyles v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp, No. 17 CV 1511, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62691, at 
*4-5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 13, 2018) (“[The Rooker-Feldman doctrine] can be complicated by any number of 
issues”); Ball v. Mayfield, 566 F. App'x 765, 769 n.3 (10th Cir. 2014) (noting the complicated 
jurisdictional issues surrounding the application of Rooker-Feldman); Pry v. Norton Hosps., No. 3:17-
CV-00777-RGJ, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31912, at *11 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 24, 2020) (“Applying the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine to this matter is somewhat complicated”). 
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B. The Birth of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine itself owes its name and legacy to two 
different Supreme Court cases. Together, these two cases established 
jurisdictional limits on federal claims brought by parties who previously 
lost in state court over a related claim.13 While this doctrine may seem 
clear-cut at first, it is anything but simple. 
The first case, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., established that state courts 
have an obligation to address any direct or indirect constitutional issues 
raised in state court proceedings and reinforced that U.S. district courts 
have strictly original jurisdiction.14 The case involved the review of an 
Indiana Supreme Court decision after the plaintiffs alleged that the state 
judgment violated the Contract, Due Process, and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the United States Constitution.15 Plaintiffs, Dora and William 
Rooker, had originally brought an action in Indiana Circuit Court after a 
dispute arose regarding a contract they entered into with Fidelity Trust 
Company.16 The trial court determined that the trust agreement was a 
mortgage and ordered a foreclosure sale.17 The Indiana Supreme Court 
reversed on appeal, holding that the agreement was an absolute deed of 
trust and not a mortgage.18 The Rookers were accordingly granted a new 
trial.19  
In the new trial, however, Fidelity Trust Co. prevailed once again after 
the trial court determined that Fidelity had faithfully performed its duties 
as trustee.20 The Rookers again appealed to the Indiana Supreme Court, 
which affirmed the judgment after finding no reversible error.21 
Subsequently, the Rookers petitioned for a rehearing, claiming that the 
state statute in controversy violated the Constitution.22 This petition was 
ultimately denied.23  The Supreme Court of the United States originally 
denied a grant of certiorari, but the Chief Justice of the Indiana Supreme 
Court allowed a writ of error to the Court.24 
The Court held the case was inappropriate to review on writ of error 
 
 13.  Lance, 546 U.S. at 463. 
 14.  263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923).  
 15.  Id. at 414-15. 
 16.  Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 109 N.E. 766, 766 (Ind. 1915). 
 17.  Id. at 768-69. 
 18.  Id. at 770. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 131 N.E. 769, 773 (Ind. 1921) cert. denied, 259 U.S. 580 (1922), 
writ of error dismissed by 261 U.S. 114 (1923). 
 21.  Id. at 776. 
 22.  Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. (Rooker I), 261 U.S. 114, 116-17 (1923). 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 259 U.S. 580 (1922) (denying certiorari); 259 U.S. 577 
(1922) (same). 
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and dismissed the Rookers’ claim.25 In a last-ditch effort, the Rookers 
filed a suit in federal district court, alleging that the Indiana court’s 
judgment should be declared void based on the same constitutional claims 
that were dismissed by the Supreme Court previously.26 The U.S. District 
Court for the District of Indiana dismissed the Rookers’ bill for lack of 
jurisdiction.27 The Rookers once again appealed directly to the Supreme 
Court.  
There, at the endpoint to the Rookers’ long and arduous legal battle, 
the Court affirmed the dismissal.28 The Court reasoned that it was the 
“province and duty of the state courts” to decide any constitutional 
questions that would have arose in the case or through its judgment.29 
Furthermore, it reiterated that district courts have strictly original 
jurisdiction and “no court of the United States other than this Court could 
entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify the judgment for errors of that 
character.”30 Therefore, any decision from the Indiana Supreme Court 
could only be appealed directly to Supreme Court of the United States, so 
the district court was correct to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.  
The next case, decided sixty years later, furthered the doctrine by 
establishing the standard for what constitutes a judicial decision for 
purposes of Rooker-Feldman.31 In District of Columbia Court of Appeals 
v. Feldman,32 Marc Feldman was denied admission to the District of 
Columbia Bar because he failed to meet the Bar’s requirement that 
applicants be graduates of an ABA-approved law school.33 The 
Committee on Admissions of the D.C. Bar noted that, while waivers for 
this requirement were possible, they could only be granted by the District 
of Columbia Court of Appeals.34 Feldman then submitted a petition to the 
D.C. Court of Appeals, D.C.’s equivalent of a highest state court,35 for 
admission to the Bar without examination.36 In his plea to the court, 
Feldman relied on his legal training, work experience, and other 
qualifications to argue that his training had been equivalent to that offered 
by ABA-approved law schools.37  
 
 25.  Rooker I, 261 U.S. at 118. 
 26.  Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. (Rooker or Rooker II), 263 U.S. 413, 414 (1923). 
 27.  Id. at 415. 
 28.  Id. at 417. 
 29.  Id. at 415. 
 30.  Id. at 416. 
 31.  District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476-79 (1983). 
 32.  Id.  
 33.  Id. at 465-66. 
 34.  Id. at 466. 
 35.  28 U.S.C. § 1257(b). 
 36.  Feldman, 460 U.S. at 466.  
 37.  Id. 
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The D.C. Court of Appeals did not respond in a timely manner, 
prompting Feldman’s counsel to write to the Chief Judge of the D.C. 
Court of Appeals, urging him to admit Feldman to the Bar.38 The letter 
reiterated Feldman’s qualifications while also suggesting that excluding 
Feldman from the practice of law simply because he did not graduate from 
an accredited school would raise important constitutional and federal 
antitrust questions.39 It also stated that “Mr. Feldman is prepared to pursue 
[those questions] in the United States District Court if necessary.”40 
Feldman’s petition was eventually denied by a per curiam order of the 
court.41 
Feldman then filed suit in federal district court, pleading the exact 
constitutional and antitrust claims threatened in the letter.42 Finding that 
the Court of Appeals’ rulings on bar applications was a judicial decision 
“which fully encompassed the constitutional and statutory issues raised,” 
the district court determined it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the 
case.43 The court reasoned that, by accepting jurisdiction over the action, 
it would be reviewing an order of a jurisdiction’s highest court.44 On 
appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
affirmed the dismissal of the antitrust claims for insubstantiality but 
reversed the dismissal of the constitutional issues after determining that 
the bar waiver proceedings were not judicial.45 The court focused on the 
fact that Feldman did not assert any right to be admitted to the bar or take 
the bar exam in his waiver petition.46 Rather, he “simply sought an 
exemption from the rule.”47  
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the proceedings for the 
petitions for waiver were judicial in nature.48 The Court reasoned that a 
judicial decision “investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they 
stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist.”49 
Accordingly, the Court held that the D.C. Court of Appeals’ bar waiver 
proceedings fit neatly into this definition and were therefore not within 
the federal district court’s jurisdiction.50 However, while the challenge to 
 
 38.  Id.  
 39.  Id. at 466-67. 
 40.  Id. at 467. 
 41.  Id. at 468. 
 42.  Id. at 468-69. 
 43.  Id. at 470. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 474. 
 46.  Id.  
 47.  Id. at 475. 
 48.  Id. at 479. 
 49.  Id. at 477. 
 50.  Id. at 482. 
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the plaintiff’s particular bar admission application was not within the 
court’s jurisdiction, the Court held that the “general challenge to the 
constitutionality” of the bar admission rule itself was within the district 
court’s jurisdiction.51 The Court reasoned that “the proceedings giving 
rise to the rule [itself] are nonjudicial.”52  
The Court also introduced one of the most convoluted parts of the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine in Feldman: the inextricably intertwined test.53 
In a footnote, the Court stated that under that test: 
[i]f the constitutional claims presented to a United States district court are 
inextricably intertwined with the state court's denial in a judicial 
proceeding of a particular plaintiff's application for admission to the state 
bar, then the district court is in essence being called upon to review the 
state-court decision, which it may not do.”54  
Aside from the footnote, the words “inextricably intertwined” were only 
mentioned in one other place in Feldman.55 Many courts interpreted this 
test to bar not only claims directly barred by Rooker-Feldman, but also 
claims closely related to those directly barred by the doctrine.56 Others 
had a more expansive interpretation, holding that it also barred claims that 
a federal plaintiff had an opportunity to litigate in a state court.57 
Regardless of how it was interpreted, the inextricably intertwined test 
became a mainstay of the doctrine for many years. 
Jointly, Rooker and Feldman attempted to create a bare bones 
framework for barring appeals to state court judgments in lower federal 
courts. Read together, the cases created a blueprint, albeit a blurry one, 
which established that state courts are required to address all 
constitutional issues that arise in a state court proceeding, and only the 
U.S. Supreme Court has the power to overturn these decisions or any state 
court decisions that are judicial in nature. 
C. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc. 
Supreme Court commentary following the birth of the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine has been sparse. One of the first major Supreme Court 
cases to provide further insight into the doctrine was Pennzoil Co. v. 
 
 51.  Id. at 483. 
 52.  Id. at 486. 
 53.  Id. at 482 n.16. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. at 486. 
 56.  Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 57.  Moccio v. New York State Office of Court Administration, 95 F.3d 195, 199-200 (2d Cir. 
1996). 
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Texaco, Inc.58 In Pennzoil, Getty Oil Co. and Pennzoil Co. had agreed that 
Pennzoil would purchase shares of Getty’s stock.59 Defendant Texaco Inc. 
ended up purchasing shares instead, leading Pennzoil to file a civil action 
in Texas state court alleging that Texaco induced Getty to breach their 
contract.60 A jury returned a verdict in favor of Pennzoil, awarding both 
actual and punitive damages exceeding $11 billion.61 Texaco would not 
have been able to pay the amount of the bond required by Rule 364(b) 
following this judgment, making it difficult for them to appeal without 
suffering hefty and devastating financial consequences.62 To combat this 
legal dilemma, Texaco filed suit in United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, alleging that the Texas proceedings 
violated Texaco’s constitutional rights and various federal statutes.63 
The district court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar 
the claim because the court was not “attempting to sit as a final or 
intermediate appellate state court as to the merits of the Texas action.”64 
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, noting that Texaco did not raise 
the due process and equal protection claims in the Texas courts, and 
therefore the district court had jurisdiction over these claims because they 
were not inextricably intertwined with the state-court action.65 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in 
the case was minimal, however. The Court held that the complaint should 
have been dismissed, noting that Texaco did not attempt to present their 
federal claims in the related state-court proceeding,66 and that principles 
such as comity dictated that the court defer to the pending state 
proceedings.67 Justice Scalia authored a concurrence, arguing that he did 
not believe that “the so-called Rooker-Feldman doctrine” prevented the 
Court from being able to decide Texaco’s challenge to the 
constitutionality of the Texas stay and lien provisions.68 His reasoning 
was that the challenge neither  involved issues litigated in state court nor 
issues inextricably intertwined with those litigated in state court.69 
 
 58.  481 U.S. 1 (1987). 
 59.  Id. at 4.  
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id.  
 62.  Id. at 4-6. 
 63.  Id. at 6. 
 64.  Id. at 7.  
 65.  Id. at 8. 
 66.  Id. at 15. 
 67.  Id. at 17. 
 68.  Id. at 18 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 69.  Id. 
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D. Exxon Mobil Corp. 
Ultimately, the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court, even after 
Pennzoil, led to a variety of splits in the circuit courts regarding the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. For example, the Seventh70 and Ninth71 
Circuits applied the doctrine narrowly, while the Second,72 Eighth,73 and 
Tenth74 Circuits interpreted it quite broadly. The Court tried to clarify the 
doctrine’s breadth and provide further direction in Exxon Mobil Corp v. 
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.75 In Exxon Mobil Corp., the Court established 
that Rooker-Feldman is not triggered simply by the existence of parallel 
state and federal court litigation.76 In this case, two Exxon Mobil 
Corporation subsidiaries formed joint ventures in 1980 with the 
defendant, Saudi Basic Industries Corp. (“SABIC”), to manufacture 
polyethylene in Saudi Arabia.77 Two decades later, the parties had a 
dispute over royalties that SABIC had charged the joint ventures for 
sublicenses to a polyethylene manufacturing method.78 SABIC sued in the 
Delaware Superior Court seeking a declaratory judgment that the royalty 
charges were permissible and consistent with the joint venture 
agreements.79 ExxonMobil and its subsidiaries countersued SABIC in the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.80 In its 
countersuit, ExxonMobil alleged that SABIC was overcharging for the 
sublicenses.81 The state suit went to trial, with the jury returning a verdict 
of over $400 million for the ExxonMobil subsidiaries.82 SABIC appealed 
 
 70.  See GASH Assocs. v. Village of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993) (determining 
that even where a federal plaintiff presents an independent claim attempting to deny a legal conclusion 
that a state court reached in the previous case, there is jurisdiction, although state law may find that the 
defendant prevails under preclusion principles). 
 71.  See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163-65 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that Rooker-Feldman does 
not bar jurisdiction where a federal plaintiff is complaining of a legal injury caused by an adverse party, 
not a state court judgment). 
 72.  See Moccio v. New York State Office of Court Administration, 95 F.3d 195, 199-200 (2d Cir. 
1996) (holding that Rooker-Feldman is broader than both claim and issue preclusion because it doesn’t 
depend on a final judgment on the merits). 
 73.  See Lemonds v. St. Louis County, 222 F.3d 488, 495 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding that Rooker-
Feldman applies to nonparties to prior state-court proceedings). 
 74.  See Kenmen Eng’g v. Union, 314 F.3d 468, 478 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that Rooker-
Feldman is applicable even when federal-court plaintiffs never had an opportunity to raise their claims in 
a prior state court proceeding). 
 75.  544 U.S. 280 (2005). 
 76.  Id. at 292. 
 77.  Id. at 289. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id.  
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. 
9
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to the Delaware Supreme Court.83 
On interlocutory appeal in the federal trial, the Third Circuit raised the 
question of subject matter jurisdiction on its own motion.84 While the 
court noted that the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction at the 
beginning of the suit, it reasoned that jurisdiction might have been lost 
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine since ExxonMobil’s claims were 
already litigated in state court.85 Rejecting ExxonMobil’s argument that 
Rooker-Feldman could not apply since ExxonMobil filed its complaint 
long before the state-court judgment, the court of appeals determined it 
was unable to proceed with the case.86 The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.87 
In the Court’s majority opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted that 
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine has only been applied by the Court to bar 
federal subject matter jurisdiction twice—in the two cases that give the 
doctrine its name.88 She also noted the lower courts often misapply it.89 
She stated that, “[v]ariously interpreted in the lower courts, the doctrine 
has sometimes been construed to extend far beyond the contours of the 
Rooker and Feldman cases, overriding Congress’ conferral of federal-
court jurisdiction concurrent with jurisdiction exercised by state laws and 
superseding the ordinary application of preclusion law[.]”90 In an attempt 
to be direct and clear, Justice Ginsburg tried to define the exact cases 
where the doctrine may be applied, stating that it is “confined to cases 
[…] brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-
court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings 
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those 
judgments.”91 With this rationale, the Court reversed the appellate court’s 
judgment, finding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply.92 
Exxon Mobil Corp. thus established that “[w]hen there is parallel state and 
federal litigation, Rooker-Feldman is not triggered simply by the entry of 
judgment in state court.”93 
 
 83.  Id.  
 84.  Id. at 290. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. at 290-91. 
 87.  Id. at 291. 
 88.  Id. at 283. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. at 284. 
 92.  Id. at 291. 
 93.  Id. at 292. 
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E. Post-Exxon Mobil Corp. Circuit Splits 
Despite Justice Ginsburg’s attempt in Exxon Mobil Corp. to clarify the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, several circuit splits have still developed 
regarding its proper application. For example, several circuits have 
fractured over whether incidents of fraud in state court proceedings may 
give rise to Rooker-Feldman. The Ninth Circuit has held that Rooker-
Feldman does not bar a federal claim alleging extrinsic fraud or “fraud 
[…] which prevents a party from presenting his claim in court.”94 Intrinsic 
fraud, defined as those which “[go] to the heart of the very issues 
contested in the state court” is barred by the doctrine, however.95 The 
Sixth Circuit has embraced a similar approach.96 Other circuits, on the 
other hand, have expressly rejected the fraud exception, including the 
Second,97 Fifth,98 Seventh,99 Eighth,100 Tenth,101 and Eleventh102 Circuits.  
Another point of confusion is whether Rooker-Feldman applies to 
interlocutory and intermediate state-court rulings.103 In 2019, the Third 
Circuit flipped on its prior post-Exxon Mobil Corp. rulings104 and held 
that only final judgments or decrees can fall under the Rooker-Feldman 
framework.105 Other circuits have agreed.106 While this interpretation 
seems to be more aligned with the context and teachings of Exxon Mobil 
 
 94.  Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Wood v. McEwen, 
644 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1981)). 
 95.  Lewis v. L.A. Metro. Transit Auth., No. CV 19-1456 PSG (JPRx), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
208440, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 10, 2019) (quoting Green v. Ancora-Citronelle Corp., 577 F.2d 1380,1384 
(9th Cir. 1978)). 
 96.  McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 392-93 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 97.  Johnson v. Smithsonian Inst., 189 F.3d 180, 187 (2d Cir. 1999); Kropelnicki v. Siegel, 290 
F.3d 118, 128 (2d Cir. 2002).  
 98.  Williams v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 04-30768, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5660, at *4 (5th Cir. 
Apr. 7, 2005). 
 99.  Kelley v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC, 548 F.3d 600, 605 (7th Cir. 2008); Taylor v. Fannie Mae, 
374 F.3d 529, 534 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 100.  Fielder v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 188 F.3d 1031, 1035-36 (8th Cir. 1999), overruled on 
other grounds by Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs. Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 560-61 (2005). 
 101.  Myers v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 16-6316, 685 Fed. Appx. 679, 681 (10th Cir. Apr. 20, 
2017). 
 102.  Scott v. Frankel, No. 14-14262, 606 F. App'x 529, 532 n.4 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Grant v. 
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 1:08-cv-1547-RWS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51031, at *10-11 (N.D. 
Ga. May 20, 2009). 
 103.  Harold v. Steel, 773 F.3d 884, 886 (7th Cir. 2014) (“We recognize that the courts of appeals 
disagree about the issue [of whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to interlocutory appeals]”). 
 104.  See, e.g., Tauro v. Baer, 395 F. App'x 875, 876-77 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam); McKnight v. 
Baker, 244 F. App'x 442, 444-45 (3d Cir. 2007); Mikhail v. Kahn, 572 F. App'x 68, 70 n.2 (3d Cir. 
2014) (per curiam).  
 105.  Malhan v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of State, 938 F.3d 453, 461 (3d Cir. 2019). 
 106.  See, e.g., Cruz v. Melecio, 204 F.3d 14, 21 n.5 (1st Cir. 2000) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine is 
limited to final judgments); Green v. Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 2009) (same, but in dictum). 
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Corp., not every court has come to the same determination.107 Similarly, 
in an action involving a property dispute, the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Louisiana noted in its discussion that “[s]ince Exxon 
Mobil Corp., the federal circuit courts have been split as to whether all 
state proceedings, including appeals, must be resolved before the federal 
suit begins in order for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply.”108 
The circuits have also been split over which analytical framework to 
use when deciding whether Rooker-Feldman applies. Courts are torn on 
whether the inextricably intertwined test, formerly the touchstone of the 
Rooker-Feldman analysis, remains intact after Exxon Mobil Corp., and if 
so, to what extent. This confusion arose because the Supreme Court 
almost ignored the phrase entirely in its Exxon Mobil Corp. opinion.109 
The Sixth Circuit has interpreted Exxon Mobil Corp. as abandoning the 
use of the phrase except for specific instances where the source of the 
injury was not the state court judgment.110 In other words, “the phrase 
‘inextricably intertwined’ has no independent content. It is simply a 
descriptive label attached to claims that meet the requirements outlined in 
Exxon Mobil.”111 The Fourth Circuit has come to a similar conclusion.112  
Other circuits continue to use the inextricably intertwined test as a 
separate scapegoat through which Rooker-Feldman may apply.113 
Circuits also disagree on whether the court must look to the nature of the 
requested relief in order to determine how to apply Rooker-Feldman.114 
The Third115 and Sixth116 Circuits have held that the court must look at 
the nature of the requested relief in their analysis. The Eleventh Circuit 
 
 107.  See, e.g., Levys v. Manning, Civil Action No. 16-1820, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175098, 2016 
WL 7664840, at **1, 4 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2016) (applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to an 
interlocutory order in a state criminal case); Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Inc., 336 F.3d 458, 461-62 
(6th Cir. 2003) (applying Rooker-Feldman to a federal suit challenging an interlocutory order); Kenman 
Eng’g v. Union, 314 F.3d 468, 474 (10th Cir. 2002) (same); Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 
F.3d 194, 199 (4th Cir. 2000) (same). 
 108.  Houston v. Queen, 8 F. Supp. 3d 815, 824 (W.D. La. 2014). 
 109.  Sophocleus v. Ala. DOT, 605 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1216 (M.D. Ala. 2009) (“The consequence 
of the Court’s ignoring the phrase means that, after Exxon, lower courts do not know if they still must 
apply ‘inextricably applied’ or how to do so”). 
 110.  McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 394-95 (6th Cir. 2006).  
 111.  Hoblock v. Albany Cnty Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 86-87 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 112.  Davani v. Va. Dep’t of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 719 (4th Cir. 2006) (“Feldman’s ‘inextricably 
intertwined’ language does not create an additional legal test […] but merely states a conclusion”).  
 113.  See, e.g., Chris H. v. New York, 764 F. App’x 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2019) (“[The Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine] also prohibits federal court review of claims ‘that are “inextricably intertwined” with state court 
determinations’”); Shawe v. Pincus, 265 F. Supp. 3d 480, 486 (D. Del. 2017) (“[Prior Third Circuit] cases 
demonstrate that […] the inextricably intertwined test [is] still valid as long as the temporal component 
does not run afoul”). 
 114.  Shallenberger v. Allegheny Cnty., No. 2:20-cv-00073-NR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52382, at 
*12 n.1 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2020) (“There appears to be a circuit split on this issue”).  
 115.  Ernst v. Child and Youth Servs. of Chester Cnty, 108 F.3d 486, 491-92 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 116.  Holloway v. Brush, 220 F.3d 767, 778-79 (6th Cir. 2000). 
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does not take this approach, finding it inconsistent with its prior 
precedents.117 Instead, the Eleventh Circuit “focus[es] on the federal 
claim’s relationship to the issues involved in the state court proceeding 
instead of the type of relief sought by the plaintiff.”118 
Although not technically circuit splits, other sources of confusion have 
come to light regarding the doctrine. For example, some circuits have 
applied a “reasonable opportunity” exception.119 Under this exception to 
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal lawsuit is allowed to proceed if 
the federal plaintiff lacked a reasonable opportunity to litigate its claims 
in the state court proceeding.120 Is this exception valid in a modern 
Rooker-Feldman analysis? The Seventh Circuit questioned this 
exception’s viability post-Exxon Mobil Corp., but has failed to expressly 
abandon it.121  Additionally, does the Rooker-Feldman doctrine apply to 
claims for prospective relief? The Sixth Circuit has held that it does not.122 
While these instances are not necessarily splits among the circuits as of 
yet, they show the Rooker-Feldman doctrine has been further muddled 
without proper Supreme Court guidance.  
III. CRITICISMS IN VANDERKODDE V. ELLIOTT 
The circuit splits and ambiguity surrounding the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine led the Sixth Circuit to question the scope of the doctrine in 
VanderKodde.123 This action involved consumers who held credit 
accounts with various financial institutions and who later defaulted on 
their debts.124 Defendants LVNV Funding and Midland Funding bought 
these debts and hired defendant Mary Jane Elliott to represent them in all 
collection proceedings.125 Elliott filed five separate actions, all of which 
ended in a judgment against the debtor.126 In these situations, Michigan’s 
Court Rules provided a post-judgment garnishment procedure: 
To collect, the creditor gives the court clerk a verified statement that 
describes the debt and the parties. MCR 3.101(D). If everything “appears 
 
 117.  Goodman ex rel. Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327, 1333 n.7 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 118.  Id. at 1333. 
 119.  Wood v. Orange Cnty, 715 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1983); Lynk v. LaPorte Superior Ct. 
No. 2, 789 F.2d 554, 564-65 (7th Cir. 1986).  
 120.  Kelley v. Med-1 Sols., LLC, 548 F.3d 600, 605 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 121.  Id. at 607 (“The reasonable opportunity exception was developed during a time when federal 
courts applied Rooker-Feldman much more expansively. Post-Exxon Mobil, the reasonable opportunity 
exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is of questionable viability”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 122.  Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290, 300 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 123.  951 F.3d at 405 (Sutton, J., concurring). 
 124.  Id at 400. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. 
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to be correct,” the clerk issues a writ of garnishment and the creditor serves 
it on the third party, the garnishee. MCR 3.101(D)-(E). Unless the 
garnishee or debtor objects, that’s usually it: the garnishee gives the money 
to the creditor rather than the debtor. MCR 3.101(J)(1).127 
Multiple requests and writs for garnishment were made in state court for 
each judgment debtor.128 None of the judgment debtors objected to any of 
the writs in the fourteen-day required window.129 The outstanding 
amounts of plaintiffs’ debts were calculated at an ultimate post-judgment 
rate of 13%, which was the maximum interest rate allowed for a judgment 
of this type.130 Plaintiffs brought suit in the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Michigan, alleging that the 13% rate was 
impermissible under Michigan law.131 
The suit was dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.132 The 
district court reasoned that the lawsuit was the equivalent of an appeal of 
the judgments and writs of garnishment in the state-court collection 
proceedings and therefore barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.133 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that this class action was 
“not the rare one that threads the Rooker-Feldman needle” for two 
reasons.134 First, a writ of garnishment is a ministerial process rather than 
a judgment, and Rooker-Feldman applies only to state court judgments.135 
Second, the plaintiff’s injuries in the federal suit did not originate from 
the writs of garnishment themselves but from the costs included in 
them.136  
Judge Sutton, writing separately in the form of a concurrence, adopted 
a more unique approach to analyzing whether Rooker-Feldman applies in 
this situation — abandoning its application almost entirely.137 Judge 
Sutton first began by noting that he agreed with the court’s judgment for 
largely the same reasons.138 He noted that “[the] lawsuit does not seek to 
undo the writs of garnishment. Just the opposite: The plaintiffs premise 
their federal lawsuit on the existence of the writs of garnishment – the 
 
 127.  Van Hoven v. Buckles & Buckles, P.L.C., 947 F.3d 889, 891 (6th Cir. 2020). 
 128.  VanderKodde, 951 F.3d at 400. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. at 401.  
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id.  
 134.  Id. at 400 (quoting Van Hoven v. Buckles & Buckles, P.L.C., 947 F.3d 889 at 892 (6th Cir. 
2020)). 
 135.  Id. at 402.  
 136.  Id. at 403. 
 137.  Id. at 409 (Sutton, J., concurring). 
 138.  Id. at 407 (Sutton, J., concurring). 
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final state court decisions.”139 However, Judge Sutton concurred to raise 
several objections to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine itself.  Judge Sutton 
accused the doctrine of deceiving federal courts into believing that they 
lack jurisdiction over cases Congress specifically empowered them to 
preside over,140 which he attributed to lower courts’ misinterpretation of 
Exxon Mobil.141 Judge Sutton wrote: “Notwithstanding Exxon Mobil’s 
efforts to return Rooker-Feldman to its modest roots, lawyers continue to 
invoke the rule and judges continue to dismiss federal actions under it.”142  
Furthermore, Judge Sutton argued the doctrine provides ample room 
for federal courts to avoid deciding federal questions.143 As Sutton 
pointed out, the doctrine was used as a heavy docket-clearing device for 
federal courts for a long time.144 This use was not surprising, considering 
“litigants continue to make expansive Rooker-Feldman arguments […] 
[a]nd lower courts keep buying them.”145 Additionally, Judge Sutton 
argued that the doctrine also encourages federal judiciaries to embrace the 
instinct to do less in an effort to defer to state courts, which, while well-
intentioned, can almost always be accomplished through other court 
principles.146 Preclusion concepts, such as claim or issue preclusion, for 
example, already confront issues like federalism and judicial comity.147 
One final argument Judge Sutton made in his plea to limit the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine was that state courts do not seem to struggle with this 
problem,148 asserting that “[c]laim and issue preclusion principles have 
worked just fine in deciding how to deal with a pending or final federal 
court action with overlapping issues.”149 
IV. DISCUSSION 
While critics have identified Rooker-Feldman’s several flaws, the 
doctrine is likely necessary in the grand scheme of the U.S. judicial 
system. Undeniably, the doctrine plays a significant role in furthering 
concepts like federalism, comity, and finality. In defense of Rooker-
Feldman, the Fourth Circuit stated that the doctrine doesn’t just promote 
 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. at 405. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id.  
 143.  Id. at 406. 
 144.  Id. at 406. (citing Susan Bandes, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Evaluating Its Jurisdictional 
Status, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1175, 1175 (1999)). 
 145.  Id. at 407.  
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. at 408. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id.  
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federalism, it preserves it.150 It also has potential to advance judicial 
efficiency because, if clearly defined, it could prevent litigants who lose 
in state court from attempting to relitigate their claims in federal court. 
The doctrine’s purpose is to force losing litigants to cut their losses and 
move on, saving the courts both time and money. These benefits are 
worthwhile only if the doctrine functions correctly, however. If the 
doctrine is left to “wreak havoc”151 on the lower courts, as Judge Sutton 
suggested that it has, then it can be more harmful than helpful. The 
solution is not to erase the doctrine, however, but rather to clarify it. The 
Supreme Court has only addressed Rooker-Feldman twelve times, with 
the last being in 2011.152 In each of these instances, the Court provided 
little clarification to the doctrine. The doctrine’s current status demands 
that the Supreme Court provide further guidance on its limits and overall 
function.  
The last time the Court attempted to hand down a clearer judgment on 
Rooker-Feldman in Exxon Mobil Corp., it still left lingering uncertainties 
regarding the doctrine’s operation. However, the case managed to provide 
some helpful clear-cut answers. For example, the Court explained that the 
doctrine is meant to be interpreted narrowly.153 The Court also affirmed 
that the doctrine neither replaces preclusion principles154 nor affects any 
of the doctrines allowing federal courts to stay or dismiss proceedings in 
deference to state-court actions.155 Going forward, the Court should 
provide similar unequivocal answers to the questions surrounding the 
doctrine’s application.  
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine has multiple facets to which the Court 
needs to provide clarity. First, although the Court tried to distinguish the 
overlap—or lack thereof—between preclusion principles and the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, the difference is still unclear to an abundance of lower 
courts and litigating parties.156 Often it seems like the analysis lies more 
in how inextricably intertwined preclusion and Rooker-Feldman are, 
rather than the state court judgment and the federal claim injury. 
However, these two principles, when functioning correctly, should serve 
different purposes and affect different claims.157 Although Justice 
 
 150.  Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 151.  VanderKodde, 951 F.3d at 405 (Sutton, J., concurring).  
 152.  Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 (2011). 
 153.  Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  See e.g., Mayotte v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 880 F.3d 1169, 1175-76 (10th Cir. 2018); Kemper 
v. Colo. Comp. Ins. Auth., 271 F. App’x 760, 762 (10th Cir. 2008); Karnecki v. City of Sisters, 775 F. 
App’x 292, 294 (9th Cir. 2019) (Nelson, J., concurring); AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden, 495 F.3d 
1143, 1153 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 157.  Adam McLain, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Toward a Workable Role, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 
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Ginsburg provided some guidance as to the differences between the two 
principles in Exxon Mobil Corp.,158 the Court needs to provide a bright 
line rule to establish when Rooker-Feldman applies and when preclusion 
principles apply to guide the lower courts regarding the doctrine’s 
lingering uncertainties.  
Second, the Court should address other splits among the circuits. For 
example, the Court should clarify whether acts of fraud are covered by 
the doctrine. The best approach for this issue may be the one taken by the 
Ninth Circuit, which held that Rooker-Feldman does not bar a federal 
claim alleging extrinsic fraud but does bar a claim for intrinsic fraud. It 
would be a major injustice to refuse to allow parties relief after a judgment 
is entered hinging on fraudulent activities by the adverse party. This 
approach strikes a proper balance between allowing some form of 
recompense for fraud, while also encouraging litigants to raise these 
claims in one proceeding if possible. The Court should decide on this and 
establish a uniform rule for the circuits.  
Third, the Court should establish how Rooker-Feldman applies to 
interlocutory or intermediate appeals. In Exxon Mobil Corp., the Court 
explained that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine involved situations where a 
state-court loser “filed suit in federal court after the state proceedings 
ended.”159 A literal interpretation of this language would mean that 
Rooker-Feldman only applies to final state-court judgments. However, if 
this was meant to be an answer, then it was done so only implicitly and 
without conviction. As one scholar pointed out, “[d]ifferent passages in 
Exxon Mobil might be read to support either view” on this issue.160 The 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine is confusing as it is. The Court should not be 
half-hearted in its approach to providing clarification regarding the 
doctrine’s scope. If the Court meant to ensure that Rooker-Feldman only 
applied to final judgments or decrees, it should have been direct and 
unequivocal about it. Therefore, on any further review of Rooker-
Feldman, the Court should create a bright line rule on whether the 
doctrine applies to interlocutory or intermediate appeals, putting any 
confusion on the issue to bed. 
Fourth, the Court should also set out the analytical framework under 
which lower courts should apply Rooker-Feldman. The circuit split is 
highly indicative of just how vague Supreme Court guidance has been 
regarding the doctrine, considering that courts are still left befuddled on 
 
1555, 1578-79 (2001). 
 158.  544 U.S. at 293. 
 159.  Id. at 291 (emphasis added). 
 160.  Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Edward L. Baskauskas, “Inextricably Intertwined” Explicable at 
Last? Rooker-Feldman Analysis After the Supreme Court’s Exxon Mobil Decision, 2006 FED. CTS L. REV. 
1 (2006). 
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how the analysis itself should look. If the language and case law 
surrounding “inextricably intertwined” is no longer relevant to the 
Rooker-Feldman discussion, then this should be stated. This issue was a 
large source of confusion pre-Exxon Mobil Corp.161 The Court’s best 
option is to abandon this language and to do so expressly. Otherwise, 
courts are left struggling to figure out how this once-important test fits 
into a modern Rooker-Feldman doctrine analysis. Furthermore, if 
assessing the nature of the relief is meant to be the new method for 
determining whether Rooker-Feldman applies, this should not only be 
stated but elaborated on. Otherwise, courts may continue dividing over 
how to apply Rooker-Feldman to the variety of situations that might 
potentially arise under the doctrine.  
Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, if a Rooker-Feldman question 
comes before the Court again, the Court should create clear boundaries 
for the doctrine’s limits. After all, the confusion among lower courts 
seems to be not in understanding the basic premise or policy concerns 
underlying the doctrine but rather its application to various situations 
where a state court proceeding might somehow be related to federal 
claims. To clarify, the Court could provide a list of concrete examples that 
showcase which activities fall in or out of the doctrine’s purview. In fact, 
lower courts have expressed that hypothetical scenarios are helpful in 
understanding the doctrine, especially post-Exxon Mobil Corp.162 
Additionally, by providing answers in a hypothetical problem-and-answer 
format, the Supreme Court would be proving to lower courts that Rooker-
Feldman is a workable doctrine capable of consistent application, rather 
than a doctrine with neither defined boundaries nor a chance of uniformity 
among circuits.  
For example, Exxon Mobil Corp. provided one group of cases falling 
outside the doctrine’s parameters: cases where a federal plaintiff 
“presents some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal 
conclusion that state court has reached in a case to which he was a 
party.”163 The Court explained that this situation would hinge on state law 
and whether the defendant prevails under preclusion principles.164 While 
this singular example provides some clarity, more concrete examples are 
necessary to understand the scope of the doctrine. After all, one would 
assume that raising a new legal theory in federal court would be enough 
to present an independent claim. However, Feldman itself explained that 
 
 161.  See supra notes 56-57.  
 162.  Davani v. Va. DOT, 434 F.3d 712, 719 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hoblock v. Albany Cnty Bd. 
of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 87-88 (2d Cir. 2005)); Mayotte v. U.S. Bank Nat'’l Ass’n, 880 F.3d 1169, 1176 
(10th Cir. 2018). 
 163.  544 U.S. at 293. 
 164.  Id. 
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simply raising federal constitutional claims, even if not raised in state 
court, still presents a claim that is “inextricably intertwined” with the 
state-court judgment.165 
In Judge Sutton’s concurrence in VanderKodde, he noted that the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine has actually been disputed more often after 
Exxon Mobil Corp.’s attempt to narrow it.166 However, this is not despite 
the fact that the Court tried to limit the doctrine. Rather, it is because it 
failed to do so in a clear-cut and readily applicable way. It would take a 
single Supreme Court opinion on Rooker-Feldman, this time with 
definitive answers and a precise framework, to qualm the abuses currently 
observed in litigation involving the doctrine.  
V. CONCLUSION 
In summary, this Note is a call for clarification on the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine. While the doctrine might seem inconsequential in some regards, 
it can majorly impact principles of fairness and judicial efficiency 
depending on how it is applied. Being a jurisdictional doctrine, courts can 
raise the Rooker-Feldman doctrine sua sponte.167 The Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine is not waivable by either party.168 If wrongly applied, it has the 
all-important effect of depriving a litigating party from due process or 
forcing them to litigate independent issues in a state court. Additionally, 
while other forum allocation doctrines, such as abstention or preclusion, 
have safeguards like the fair hearing or public interest exception, the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine lacks such flexibility.169 Furthermore, if one of 
the doctrine’s main benefits is judicial efficiency,170 then the Court needs 
to ensure that it serves that purpose. A doctrine that causes confusion 
among lower courts and allows for plaintiffs to artfully manipulate it does 
not serve that purpose. In fact, it antagonizes it.  
Largely, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a judicial theory that has been 
developed in piecemeal, beginning with Rooker and eventually followed 
by Feldman. While Pennzoil and Exxon Mobil Corp. ultimately helped 
establish boundaries for the doctrine, a number of unanticipated situations 
 
 165.  District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,  483-84 n. 16 (1983). 
 166.  VanderKodde, 951 F.3d at 407 (Sutton, J., concurring) (citing Raphael Graybill, 
Comment, The Rook That Would Be King: Rooker-Feldman Abstention Analysis After Saudi Basic, 32 
YALE J. ON REG. 591, 591-92 (2015)). 
 167.  Susan Bandes, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Evaluating Its Jurisdictional Status, 74 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1175, 1177 (1999). 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id. at 1177-78. 
 170.  Kyles v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp, No. 17 CV 1511, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62691, at 
*10 n.7 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 13, 2018) (noting that while Rooker-Feldman may not be grounded in concerns of 
efficiency, it still promotes it to the extent that it prevents duplicative appeals in state and federal court). 
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have arisen that create confusion surrounding the application of Rooker-
Feldman. While a court cannot imagine every scenario that might lend 
itself to the scope of Rooker-Feldman, a large number of these scenarios 
have already been raised and adjudicated over the years, with differing 
and conflicting results. As such, Judge Sutton has good reason for 
growing tired of the doctrine and its mischief. The answer, however, 
cannot be found in abandoning the seemingly archaic doctrine. Instead, 
the answer lies in the Supreme Court giving the next piece in the Rooker-
Feldman puzzle. Although Judge Sutton suspects it never will,171 there is 
more than enough reason to provide answers to lower courts with nothing 
but questions. It is also worth mentioning that Judge Sutton does not seem 
completely opposed to having more clarity from the Supreme Court 
regarding the doctrine.172 Should the Supreme Court refuse to act on the 
matter, however, it is likely that havoc and chaos will continue to be the 





 171.  VanderKodde, 951 F.3d at 409 (Sutton, J., concurring). 
 172.  Id. at 405 (“Here's to urging the Court to give one last requiem to Rooker-Feldman”). 
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